Detailed and flexible planning was a key success factor for the 1st ascent of Mount Everest on May 29, 1953; when Sir Edmund Hillary and Sherpa Tenzing Norgay reached the 8848-meter summit of Mount Everest, becoming the first people to stand atop the world’s highest mountain.
Considering reconnaissance and climbing expeditions starting in 1921, it was the 15th and the 1st successful attempt. Previous experiences contributed a lot to it, but there was a key factor to the expedition’s success, planning.
Many of earlier expeditions, had impressive accomplishments by that time but were often charmingly informal in planning terms. In 1953 the Himalayan Committee ( the Alpine Club and the Royal Geographical Society) surprisingly choose Col. John Hunt as the 1953 British expedition leader, instead of the expected candidate, Eric Shipton who had previous experience in the mountain and was one of the most extraordinary expeditionary and mountaineer of his time. However, the committee opted for Hunt’s experience of military leadership and as a climber.
It proved to be a great decision. Using his experience, Hunt did a formidable planning job. It is reflected in a memorandum called “Basis of planning” prepared in November 1952 by John Hunt, months before the expedition departure’s. It served as a framework for the program put into effect.
It deserves to be read completely because is a masterpiece in terms of presenting the problem, how to solve it, logistic details, risk management, and finance, in a very clear and detailed form (a complete copy of the document appears in an Appendix below) This is how it starts:
1. The ultimate aim of the Expedition, as defined by the Sponsoring Authority, is the ascent of Everest during 1953 by a member or members of the party. This aim may appear self-evident, but it is of vital importance that it should be borne constantly in mind, both during the preparatory phase and, later, in the field. All planning and preparation must lead us methodically toward the achievement of that aim.
2. The purpose of this Memorandum is to provide a basis for all who will be working on the various aspects of the planning and preparation for the Expedition.
It is mainly focused on the assault. The requirements of the assault plan are basic and must be met in terms of climbers, porters, equipment, and stores.
It is stressed that this is not a firm and final plan; this can only be made at a much later date in the field.
3. Planning Papers are attached as Appendices to this Memorandum as follows:
Appendix A The Ascent (Build-up and Assault).
Appendix B The Preparatory Period.
Appendix C The Expedition Timetable.
The memorandum has many interesting concepts. One is this definition It is stressed that this is not a firm and final plan; this can only be made at a much later date in the field. The proposed plan was a guideline, but they knew they will require to adjust it on the field, based on the existing conditions. Another is the incremental approach. The plan considered establishing successive camps in the mountain until they were able to attempt the summit. Also, the contingency approach for the summit attempt, considering three teams ready for it ( The 2nd team was the one that succeeded)
Before departing to Nepal they tested clothes and oxygen equipment and trained in winter in a very cold region in Wales. And also had the invaluable contribution of an eccentric physiologist and mountaineer, Griffith Pugh. He did research studying climbers in the field at altitude, and he analyzed rates of breathing, and food and fluid intake. His findings were of fundamental value to the expedition.
They also considered a two-month preparation period including the march from Kathmandu to the Khumbu region, and the acclimatization period, before starting the Everest ascent attempt.
All the planning and preparation effort was crucial to the expedition’s success. The 1st attempt failed. Two climbers come within 100 meters of the final summit but were forced to turn back. Finally, at 11:30 am on 29 May 1953 the second climbing pair, the New Zealander Edmund Hillary and Sherpa Tenzing Norgay from Nepal reached the Everest summit.
As John Hunt wrote the whole story, for the ascent of Everest was not the work of one day, nor even of those few anxious, unforgettable weeks last spring in which we prepared and climbed the mountain. It is, in fact, a tale of sustained and tenacious endeavor by many, over a long period of time.
Attachment: MEMORANDUM EVEREST, 1953
BASIS FOR PLANNING
EVEREST, 1953 – THE ASCENT
1. From a study of the Shipton reconnaissance, the Swiss premonsoon attempt and from a general comparison of the latter with the British experience on the mountain between the wars, certain factors emerge which must influence our planning for 1953.
FACTORS
- The absolute need for a sufficient period of comparative acclimatization before the assault
- The psychological effects of remaining longer on the mountain than is really necessary to the achievement of success.
- The physiological deterioration which appears to take effect high up on the mountain.
- The limitations on the amount of stores and equipment which can justifiably be carried high on the mountain. These limitations are set by:
(a) the objective dangers of the icefall;
(b) the weight which can be carried by the porters and climbers at high altitudes;
(c) the number of oxygen equipments available;
(d) the time factor, as it affects paragraphs 3 and 5 (a) above. - The importance of a suitable and acceptable diet, together with that of ensuring the consumption of sufficient liquid during the crucial assault period.
- The duration and period of favorable weather. This is likely to be very brief and to occur in the second half of May, or early in June.
- The importance of exploiting this favorable period to the maximum extent. This means:
(a) being positioned and ready in every sense to start the assault from the beginning of this period.
(b) Being so organized as to be able to continue the assault, if necessary, so long as the weather holds; in other words, to avoid the contingency of a premature retreat
CONCLUSIONS - From these factors it is possible to establish certain conclusions which will form the basis of the planning. (Scientific conclusions are not dealt with under this heading.)
(a) There must be an acclimatization period, which should be spent in an area other than Everest.
(b) Once the Base Camp has been established, the ascent of the mountain must be a continuous process, carefully planned so as to be completed in the minimum time consistent with success.
(c) There must be provision in the plan for a number of assaults, each capable of being launched consecutively at intervals of one day, if the weather conditions allow. A maximum potential of three such assaults should be assumed.
(d) Adequate logistic support must be provided in the highest camp(s) to enable the summit party(ies) to make the most of their opportunity.
(e) The first assault party and, as far as possible, the follow-up parties, must be rested and in good condition when they start. They must, therefore, be spared the heavy work at an early stage in the build-up. - The Climbing Party.
The party must be large enough to make possible the series of assaults referred to above, and at the same time to allow for sickness and provide for supervision of the build-up behind the assault.
On the other hand, it must not be so large as to become unwieldy.
To achieve a potential of three assaults, a total of ten climbers has been decided. These may be considered for planning purposes in the ratio of 6 (assault) to 4 (support). To the latter should be added the physiologist and the photographer who may be expected to take their share in the build-up. - The Porter Requirement.
The porters may be considered in three categories:
(a) Those taking part in the establishment of Advance Base (Head of S.W. Cwm).
(b) Those taking part in the establishment of the Assault Camp (South Col).
(c) Those taking part in the assault.
To some extent, these categories will overlap, e.g., all porters will be involved to a greater or lesser degree in establishing Advance Base; certain porters required to establish the Assault Camp may take part in the assault.
Taking into account a rough calculation of the load factors, the timetable at Appendix C and the intention to launch, if necessary, three assaults, it may be estimated that 25-30 Sherpas will be required. Of
these, at least 6 8 must be capable and willing to take part in the assaults and the establishment of a camp on the South Col; they must, therefore, be equipped on this basis.
PHASING OF THE PLAN
For planning purposes the over-all period of the ascent will be considered in phases, as follows: - Phase I (The Build-up).
his includes the negotiation of the icefall, and the establishment of an advanced base at the head of the Southwest Cwm, and of an assault camp on the South Col. - Phase II (The Assault).
This includes the move of the first assault party from Advance Base to the South Col and thence to the summit, followed if necessary by two further assaults.
TIMING - The expedition timetable is set out as Appendix C. From this it will be seen that Phase I should have been completed by approximately May 15th; the assault should be capable of being launched at any time after this date.
THE BUILD-UP (May 1st-15th) - This is considered in two stages:
Stage I.Establishment of Advance Base (Head of the Cwm).
Stage II. Establishment of the Assault Camp (South Col). For the purpose of this paper, a period of 10-12 days should be assumed for Stage I; 4-6 days for Stage II.
The Build-up Stage I (10-12 days). - The problem is the move, over a period of 10-12 days, of personnel, equipment and stores from Base Camp, at 16,000 feet on the bank of the Khumbu glacier, to an Advance Base at approximately
23,000 feet 5 at the head of the Western Cwm. The principal difficulty is the negotiation, and use during the build-up, of the icefall descending from the lower edge of the Cwm, over a vertical interval of over
2,000 feet.
Bearing in mind the objective danger of the icefall, its relatively low elevation and the importance of concentrating the maximum logistic backing at Advance Base for the assault, we will assume for planning
purposes that:
(a) Only one camp will be established in the icefall;
(b) by the end of this first stage of the build-up, sufficient equipment and stores will have been carried forward to reduce movement between Base Camp and Advance Base to intermittent journeys only. - Camps.
These will probably be required ahead of Base Camp, during the first stage of the build-up as follows:
Camp I (foot of the Icefall) 4 Meades
Camp II (in the Icefall) 4 Meades
Camp III (top of the Icefall) 4 Meades
These camps can be reduced, probably by two Meades at the end of Stage I, the spare tents being carried forward to Advance Base. - Capacity of Advance Base.
This must be capable of housing, during a peak period:
10 Climbers
16 Porters
Of these:
6 Europeans and 6 porters will comprise the assault party.
2 Europeans and 6-10 porters will be concerned with establishing the Assault Camp (South Col).
2 Europeans will be physiologist: photographer, leaving a balance of 2 Europeans and 10-15 porters,
who may be assumed to be at camps between (inclusive) Base Camp and Camp III.
This requirement might be met by one 12-man Dome (or two 6-man Domes) and 7 to 8 Meades.
The Build-up Stage II (4-6 days). - In order to establish the Assault Camp, it will be necessary to carry tentage, equipment, and stores up the Lhotse Face, a vertical height of about 3,000 feet starting at 23,000 feet. The Assault Camp must be capable of supporting at any one time, at or above the South Col, up to a total of 12 climbers and porters.
In order to economize on the number of oxygen equipments and cylinders the “carry” required to complete Stage II will probably have to be done without oxygen.
This will entail the establishment of an intermediate camp on the Lhotse Face (Camp V); its capacity should be for four climbers/porters.
THE ASSAULT (after May 15th) - The general concept of the assault will be the advance of the assault parties from Advance Base to the summit of Everest, spending (if necessary) one night at Camp V (Lhotse Face), one night at Camp VI (South Col) and (if necessary) a third night at a Camp VII to be established as high as possible on the southeast ridge.
- Each assault party will consist of 4 climbers 2 Europeans and 2 Sherpas. Of these, the Europeans will be the potential summit party, the bulk of the load being carried by the Sherpas. Depending on the
condition of the climbers in the final stages, however, it may well be that the summit party may consist of 1 European and 1 porter. - All four climbers will use oxygen from Advance Base onward for the upward journey. In calculating the oxygen requirement, it may be assumed that oxygen will not be used for the descent below the Ridge Camp (see para. 23). Sleeping oxygen will, however, be required at the Assault Camp and at the Ridge Camp (Camp VII).
- Depending on the condition of the climbers, the success of the oxygen and the weather, it may be possible to reach the summit from the South Col. The first party will, however, be self-contained after
leaving the Assault Camp (South Col), with a tent and equipment for the summit party (two Europeans) for one night. - This ultimate camp will be established in any event. Should it be necessary, the summit party will remain there, the other pair returning to the Assault Camp (Camp VI).
If, on the other hand, it is found possible for the summit party to continue to the top in one day from the South Col, then the other pair will set up the tent, and wait to escort the summit party down to the South Col. - In order to make possible the “carry” of the oxygen cylinders required for the final part of the climb, in addition to the other equipment necessary for Camp VI (South Col), the site will be chosen and an initial “carry” of loads will be undertaken by a party of one European and two Sherpas (to be known as the Support Party), who will have arrived at the South Col at the end of the build-up phase. This will take place either on the same day that the first Assault Party leaves Advance Base, or on the day after (D-Day or D plus 1), or both.
This Support Party will be available to accompany the first Assault Party on its way up from the South Col should the load situation so demand.
The Support Party will descend to Advance Base as soon as this task is complete. It will use oxygen for the upward journey or journeys above the South Col. - The second Assault Party, composed as for the first party, will leave Advance Base one day later and will go up to Camp VI (South Col) l on the South Col. If the first party are not successful (or in any case), the second party will make their attempt on exactly the same basis as before, with the exception that they will be able to use the emergency camp (Camp VII [Ridge]) if this has been set up by the first party.
- A third Assault Party will leave Advance Base for the South Col one day after the second Assault Party
and will make an attempt on the summit if neither of the preceding parties has succeeded (or in any case).
THE TENTATIVE PLAN - In the eventual plan, which will be made on the mountain itself, the timing of the assaults (in terms of the vertical distances to be covered in one day) will depend primarily on the actual assistance given by oxygen.
This paper is NOT the eventual plan and the actual value to be derived from the oxygen is not proven. While taking due account of the need for economy and of the potential value of oxygen as an “altitude
reducer,” we must, therefore, lay down the basis for preparatory planning on an “unfavorable case.” - In order to enable calculations to be made on an “unfavorable case” basis, it has been assumed that:
(a) Three assaults are necessary, e.g., only the last is successful.
(b) Two of the three assault parties will spend a night at Camp V (Lhotse Face) on the upward journey, the third going straight up to the South Col from Advance Base,
(c) Two of the three Assault Parties will spend a night at Camp VII (Ridge Camp), the third going straight for the summit from the South Col. - From the tentative schedule, it will be seen that:
(a) There may be up to twelve climbers/porters, at the Assault Camp at any one time.
(b) Fifteen separate oxygen equipments will be required, four for each Assault Party and three for the Support Party.
EVEREST 1953 – THE PREPARATION PERIOD
Introduction
- This period includes both the march-out to Khumbu (in principle the month of March), and the acclimatization period (in principle the month of April) preceding the actual operations on Everest itself.
The object of this paper is to provide a forecast of the activities of the party during these two months, as a basis for provisioning, the recruiting of porters/carriers and the ordering of equipment. - It is assumed that the march-out will require a period of three weeks from Katmandu and that up to four weeks will be devoted to acclimatizing in the Khumbu district, making a total of seven weeks in all.
These four weeks may have to be curtailed should the weather and/or the conditions on Everest demand an advancement of the planned date for initiating operations on the mountain. It is unlikely that it will be possible to prolong the period of acclimatization prior to starting the build-up.
The March-Out - We must bear in mind that, as an expensive sponsored expedition of national importance, we cannot indulge in the same liberties as a private party. It is of particular importance that all possible steps
should be taken during the march-out to ensure that the health and the strength of the party are preserved. - To this end:
(a) The medical officer is requested before the party leaves Katmandu to draw up and issue essential hygiene rules to be observed by everyone, and to assist by advice during the march itself.
(b) The diet of the party will be basically expedition rations, supplemented from local resources, as approved by the medical officer. A Sherpa cook will be engaged from Katmandu onward.
For provisioning purposes a 75 per cent ration scale should be allowed for during the march-out.
(c) Camp sites will be chosen away from villages; local houses will not be used during this period. - It is also important that expedition boots and other equipment provided expressly for the ascent of Everest should not become worn out during the approach march.
Members of the expedition are therefore requested to provide themselves with light clothing and footwear for the march. Shorts and “rubbers” or “Chapplis” are recommended.
The Acclimatization Period - The main objectives to be attained in this period will be:
(a) to continue and improve the acclimatization of members from the condition reached on arrival in Khumbu;
(b) to familiarize everyone with the expedition equipment and rations, including the use of the oxygen equipment;
(c) to enable everyone to get to know each other “on the rope”;
(d) to explore country in die general vicinity of Everest, but NOT the mountain itself. - As regards 6(a) and 6(d) it is important that we do not allow ourselves to be diverted from our main objective by undertaking ambitious climbing projects during this period. We must constantly bear in mind
that this is simply a period of preparation for our real goal. - As regards 6(b), the oxygen officer is requested to instruct, arrange for trials to be made, and supervise practice in the use of oxygen equipments.
- As regards 6(c), it is proposed to divide the period into two spells of say, 8-10 days, with a break of 3-4 days in the middle.
The party will divide into three-four small caravans each of 3-4 Europeans and 4-5 high-altitude porters: each party will carry out its own program and all will reassemble at a base camp for rest and discussions
at the end of the first spell.
The parties will then be reconstituted and move out again for the second acclimatization spell. - As regards point 6(d), particular importance is attached to the timing of our operations on Everest. Partly for psychological reasons and partly because of the probable physical conditions obtaining on the mountain itself until late April, it is desirable to direct our activities in other areas.
- In principle, expedition rations will be eaten throughout the acclimatization period; it is hoped, however, that local fresh food (including meat on hoof) will be available at Base Camp.
The Porters - It is planned to recruit 25-30 porters, making an eventual total number on the mountain of about 40 (12 Europeans, 28 Sherpas).
Of these 28 Sherpas, it is anticipated that about 16 will be required for high-altitude climbing (at and above Advance Base), the remainder being needed for the build-up as far as the top of the Icefall.
In calculating high-altitude rations, equipment, and clothing, therefore, these sixteen must be fully provided for. The balance of 12-14 porters will require equipment, clothing, and rations suitable for operations up to the top of the Icefall. - The 16 high-altitude porters must clearly all be men with previous expedition experience. They will be required throughout the preparatory period, in particular during the acclimatization period in the
Khumbu district.
The remaining 12-14 may be recruited later and locally; they should join the expedition before the main operations start on the mountain itself.